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ABSTRACT 
 This Article discusses and examines the various cases that pertain 
to the issue of exceeding authorized access throughout the years from 
United States v. Morris to the recent United States v. Nosal. Further, 
this Article thoroughly examines the ninth circuit’s approach regarding 
the issue of exceeding authorization; specifically, the need for the ninth 
circuit’s narrower interpretation United States v. Brekka and Nosal. Fi-
nally, this Article proposes an alternative phrasing for the term “ex-
ceeding authorization,” and a revised interpretation of the phrase and 
the relevant offenses under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. This 
recommended interpretation suggests establishing different degrees of 
authorization. In accordance with the new approach promoted by Nosal 
and Senator Lofgren’s Aaron’s Law Bill, this Article argues that misus-
es of information by authorized users should not be categorized as a 
computer misuse offense, but rather as a privacy law issue. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Cybercrime legislation has been a peculiar area of law that was 
first created as a response to public fears generated by a hacker-related 
movie, War Games, before the advent of the Internet.1 Cybercrime legis-
lation has gotten stricter as it has expanded due to consistent political 
support for increased control of online activity.  It seems that policy-
makers have a general indifference to the practical effects of the contin-
ued increase of restrictions and penalties.2 The primary reason for 
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 promulgating cybercrime legislation has been the prevention of increas-
ing damages and losses resulting from cybercrime.3 This is consistent 
with policy-making on risk minimization and the prioritization of secu-
rity.4 
 In the United States, the main piece of legislation that deals with 
computer crime is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).5 The 
CFAA structurally relies on the concept of authorization. Liability un-
der the CFAA attaches only where the perpetrators, without authoriza-
tion or exceeding their authorization, access or impact computers and 
the information contained in these computers. The Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984 was the legislation that preceded the CFAA 
that was aimed at countering computer hacking.6  The Act did not per-
tain to insider misuse of information and the term “exceeding author-
ized access” did not exist.7 The CFAA term “exceeding authorized ac-
cess” replaces what was described in the first Act of 1984 as “having 
accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such ac-
cess provides for purposes to which authorization does not extend.”8 
 “Unauthorized access” is undefined in the CFAA.  This term re-
lates to actions by outsiders who have no authorization to access a cer-
tain computer network and the information contained on the network 
yet, these outsiders manage to bypass the technical controls that pre-
vent unauthorized users from accessing and making use of the infor-
mation or the network resources. The term applicable to insiders—those 
who have some degree of authorization to access certain networks and 
information—is “exceeding authorized access.” This term is defined in 
Section 1030(e)(6) of the CFAA: “to access a computer with authoriza-
tion and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the comput-
er that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”9 However, the 
concept of “exceeding authorized access” has been interpreted in differ-
ent ways by courts depending upon the context of the cases. 
 The recent U.S. court decisions in United States v. Brekka and 
mainly United States v. Nosal essentially challenged pre-existing inter-
pretations, with the aim of avoiding prosecutions of insiders under the 
CFAA, when there is no violation of technological restrictions. These re-
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 cent Ninth Circuit cases have redefined the way “exceeding authoriza-
tion” is perceived, in an attempt to reinstate the focus of the CFAA on 
computer abuse, rather than misuse of information accessed by comput-
ers or existing in them. This sounds like a logical development that is 
consistent with the need to employ the CFAA for the offenses it was ini-
tially created to counter and not as an all-encompassing tool for misuses 
of information regardless of form (i.e., electronic/computer).  However, 
the current structure of the CFAA and prior case law pertaining to the 
issue of authorization might prove challenging for the new approach to 
be established without some major revamping of the CFAA as well. The 
CFAA’s initial goal was to prevent computer abuse in the form of exter-
nal hacking. However, later consecutive amendments to the CFAA have 
expanded its scope in parallel with the increasing importance of com-
puter systems and information contained in them to protect the privacy 
of information and not just the integrity of the computer systems.10 Alt-
hough Nosal focuses on the initial goal of the CFAA, the legal system is 
now capable of accommodating and resolving the privacy-related risks 
without the need of cybercrime laws that are based on hacking. 
 This Article will analyse the new approach and compare the new 
approach to the precedent established prior to Nosal. Additionally, this 
Article will suggest a way for to structure and interpret the issue of au-
thorization that will satisfy both the wording of the CFAA and the tele-
ological interpretations of the CFAA as discussed in Nosal, and be con-
sistent with contemporary suggestions for amending the CFAA. These 
discussions, based on the rationales and aims of Nosal, began after the 
broad interpretations of exceeding authorized access led to the highly 
aggressive prosecution, and eventually the suicide of an Internet prodi-
gy and activist, Aaron Swartz,11 which fuelled the already-existing dis-
cussions about the need to amend the CFAA.12 
 This Article is separated into three parts. Part II will discuss the 
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 dominant approach pertaining to the concept of exceeding authoriza-
tion, which was shaped by existing case law. Part III will discuss the 
cases of Brekka and Nosal, tracing the gradual development and con-
cretization of the new approach that Nosal eventually established after 
a series of hearings.  Part IV will draw some conclusions from these 
cases regarding the usefulness of the new approach and potential issues 
that might arise from its application. Part V will then discuss a new 
way for perceiving authorization that can lead to a more harmonious 
application of the Nosal approach.  Part V will also suggest some neces-
sary, harmonizing amendments that will aim to satisfy the concerns of 
the U.S. government as to the sanctioning of cases of unintended use of 
information, the purpose of Nosal, and the new CFAA bill suggested by 
Sen. Lofgren.13  
II. THE ESTABLISHED APPROACH TO  
EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED ACCESS  
A. THE “INTENDED FUNCTION” TEST 
 United States v. Morris established an important test for assessing 
the exceeding of authorized access.14 In Morris, a Cornell university 
student created and transmitted a self-replicating, malign computer 
program called a “worm.”15 The worm was designed to take advantage 
of and highlight specific security flaws in the then-nascent Internet, ex-
ploiting program weaknesses in order for the worm to spread to multi-
ple computers.16 Morris was initially tried under 18 U.S.C. Section 
1030(a)(5)(A), which at the time prohibited access to a “Federal interest 
computer” without authorization, if that access resulted in damage.17 
 Morris was convicted and then he appealed the conviction.  The de-
fendant argued that he had authorization to access several of the in-
fected computers since many of these computers belonged to University 
networks that Morris had legitimate accounts at, such as Cornell, 
Berkeley and Harvard.18 Morris argued that his access, regardless of 
whether his access was in fact unauthorized, should not be considered 
unauthorized.  Rather, the defendant argued that his access in all in-
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 stances should be considered only as instances of exceeding his given 
authorization, consequently absolving him from liability under Section 
1030(a)(5)(A) which only required unauthorized access. In support of his 
argument, the defendant referenced a 1986 U.S. Senate Report that 
suggested a difference between “unauthorized access” and “access ex-
ceeding authorization” in relation to the difference between outsiders 
and insiders.19 The former being those persons lacking any authoriza-
tion whatsoever (i.e., external hackers) and the latter being those per-
sons with some authorization to access, the limits of which they would 
be disregarding.20 Consequently, according to Morris, since he was au-
thorized to access the University computers he held accounts at and the 
worm originated from one these University computers, he could not be 
convicted of offenses relating to unauthorized access because he should 
be considered an insider to the network of interconnected computers.21 
Morris wanted to be considered an insider to all the computers connect-
ed to the same University network because he had access to one of those 
computers in the network.  In other words, once a person had authori-
zation to access one computer, this person would be considered to have 
authorization to access every interconnected computer on the Internet. 
The Second Circuit court rejected Morris’ argument by stating, “Con-
gress was not drawing a bright line between those who have some ac-
cess to any federal interest computer and those who have none. Con-
gress contemplated that individuals with access to some federal interest 
computers would be subject to liability under the computer fraud provi-
sions for gaining unauthorized access to other federal interest comput-
ers.”22  
 With regard to the issue of exceeding authorization, the Morris 
court held that Morris exceeded his authorization when he installed the 
worm onto computers Morris initially had authorization to access.23  
However, where Morris installed the worm onto computers that he did 
not have authorization to access, his access was unauthorized because 
access to some federal computers did not mean that he was considered 
to have access to all of the federal computers that his worm eventually 
spread to.24 
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  The Morris court then established a new standard for determining 
the lack of authorization, which focused on whether the access was ob-
tained through the use of software in intended ways.25  The Morris 
court found that the programs Morris had exploited in order to allow his 
worm to replicate itself onto additional computers were not used in ac-
cordance with their normal function.26  The security flaws in the soft-
ware had been exploited by the defendant to facilitate access to further 
computers Morris lacked authorization to access, thus enabling the 
worm to spread further. Morris gained access via a worm program by 
exploiting particular software bugs that related to an unintended use of 
these flawed programs; therefore, his access was rendered unauthor-
ized. Although the Morris court found that Morris exceeded his authori-
zation when he installed the worm onto the computers that he was au-
thorized to access, it is unclear whether the court reached this 
conclusion by applying the same “intended purpose” test it employed for 
assessing the lack of authorization. Regardless, it would be a safe pre-
sumption that the mere insertion of a worm into a computer that one is 
authorized to access would also be contradicting the intended purpose of 
the computer that one has been authorized to use.  Further, this con-
duct would contradict the authorized access to the exploited software in 
the computers; therefore, a similar rationale could indeed be employed 
for assessing whether someone has exceeded his/her authorization by 
introducing malware or viruses into computer systems he/she was au-
thorized to access and make normal use of. 
 As Orin S. Kerr discusses in a law review article, the “intended 
purpose” test seems to have derived from programmer community 
norms.  These norms provide that software designers create programs 
to perform certain tasks and network providers implicitly authorize 
computer users to employ these programs to perform the tasks they 
were designed to operate.27 Yet, as Kerr acknowledges, network provid-
ers would not authorize the exploitation of weaknesses in the programs 
in order to manipulate these programs and use them for unintended 
functions.28 Morris, despite its importance, is a complex case regarding 
the distinction between unauthorized access per se and exceeding au-
thorization.  The Morris court was trying to prove the existence of un-
authorized access through the defendant’s misuse of software, rather 
than the exceeding of authorization for computers he was allowed to ac-
cess (which was not punishable at the time). The “intended use” test of 
authorization will become more obvious once we examine the relevant 
case law that involves actual insiders.  
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 B. CZUBINSKI AND EXPLORICA: ESTABLISHING  
THE “INTENDED USE” TEST 
 United States v. Czubinski exemplifies the “intended function” test 
pertaining to insiders.
29
 The defendant was an employee of the Internal 
Revenue Service in Boston, Massachusetts. Czubinski was authorized 
to access information regarding any taxpayer in the IRS computer sys-
tems via his work password.
30
 IRS rules provided that employees au-
thorized to access the IRS computer systems were not permitted to ac-
cess the files held in those databases for reasons other than performing 
their official duties.
31
 During his employment, Czubinski conducted 
many unauthorized searches of IRS computer files, knowingly disre-
garding the rules and viewing confidential information obtained by per-
forming computer searches that were not related to his official IRS du-
ties.
32
 Czubinski’s unauthorized searches involved family members, 
state officials and others, yet no further use had been made of that in-
formation.
33
 Czubinski remained in employment until he was indicted 
in 1995 by a grand jury on many counts, four of which related to federal 
computer fraud under the CFAA Section 1030(a)(4).
34
  
 At the time the case was tried, the text of the computer fraud pro-
vision was:  
whoever ... knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a Federal 
interest computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, 
and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains 
anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing ob-
tained consists only of the use of the computer.35 
The appellate court verified that Czubinski “unquestionably ex-
ceeded authorized access to a federal interest computer,”36 because he 
had used his authorization to access personal information of taxpayers 
to satisfy his curiosity and not for his official duties.37 However, the 
court found Czubinski innocent as to computer fraud because unauthor-
ized access is a particular type of means to further a specific goal—
obtaining something of value.  Here, Czubinski was only satisfying his 
curiosity and not obtaining something of value during his unauthorized 
access; therefore, he was not guilty of computer fraud.38   
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  The Czubinski court applied a similar test as the “intended use” 
test in Morris for assessing the limits of authorization for insiders, 
based on the instructions and use policies of the employer. When the 
employee’s use of his authorization is inconsistent with the instructions 
of the employer, the employee is exceeding his authorization.  
 In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., the court discussed ex-
ceeding one’s authorization in the civil context of contractual rela-
tions.39 Although Brekka and Nosal refer to employer-employee rela-
tionships, the courts have discussed authorization as requiring a 
unified interpretation and these decisions have been considered im-
portant not only for employer-employee relationships, but also for cases 
relating to terms of use of websites and online services and whether 
their violation could also constitute lack or excess of authorization. This 
aspect of exceeding authorization was an important issue in Brekka and 
Nosal and will be a focal point of this Article. Explorica provides the 
majority approach regarding the interplay of website terms and condi-
tions and unauthorized access or one’s exceeding of authorization. In 
Explorica, defendant Explorica, Inc. was selling vacation packages 
formed by former EF Cultural Travel (EF) employees in direct competi-
tion against EF. Due to these facts, a confidentiality agreement was 
signed between EF and the vice president of Explorica, Inc., who was 
also a former employee of the former company.40 The agreement pre-
vented the disclosure of “technical, business, or financial information, 
the use or disclosure of which might reasonably be construed to be con-
trary to the interests of [EF].”41 
Despite the agreement between the two companies, Explorica’s 
head, Gormley, collaborated with Zefer, Explorica’s Internet consultant, 
in developing a computer program that could collect all the publicly 
available information (Scraper) from the EF website, in facilitation of 
Explorica’s competition with EF.42 This program was designed specifi-
cally using technical details about the EF website in order to collect and 
compile information regarding the EF website that other similar pro-
grams would not be able to do with such efficiency.43 The whole process 
eventually allowed Explorica to undercut EF’s business and lead EF to 
sue Explorica for violation of the CFAA.44 
Initially, after finding out about the Scraper program, EF requested 
an injunction to prevent Explorica and Zefer from using the program 
and demanded that all information collected through the Scraper pro-
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 gram be returned.45 The district court granted a preliminary injunction 
against Explorica based on the CFAA, which criminally and civilly pro-
hibits certain types of access to computers.46 The district court found 
that Explorica violated the CFAA by using EF’s website in ways that 
were beyond the reasonable expectations of EF and the ordinary uses of 
its website, even if the information was publicly accessible.47  
The district court also found that EF could argue it had suffered 
losses due to reduced business, harm to goodwill, and the cost of em-
ploying diagnostic systems to assess possible harms to its network, yet 
not physical damage to EF’s computers.48 The court explained its “rea-
sonable expectations” standard (similar to Czubunski’s “intended use” 
test) and argued that the copyright indications displayed on one of the 
pages, the contractual obligations between Gormley and EF, which 
would be violated by Gormley providing information for designing the 
specialised Scraper, and the bypassing of technical restraints of EF’s 
website by the Scraper, constitute adequate notifying elements for Ex-
plorica to realize that the deployment of the Scraper would be unau-
thorized, consequently violating the CFAA.49  
On appeal, Explorica argued that the district court adopted an 
overtly narrow approach to authorization and misinterpreted the extent 
of the confidentiality agreement.50 Additionally, Explorica argued that 
the court erred in finding that EF had suffered a loss and that the in-
junction was a violation of the First Amendment.51 
Although the appellate court examined all of these issues, this Arti-
cle will focus only on the appellate court’s interpretation of the issues 
pertaining to authorization and the interpretation of exceeding author-
ized access, both which were considered crucial for establishing the 
charge of computer fraud under Section 1030(a)(4). The appellate court 
focused on the confidentiality agreement and concluded, “because of the 
broad confidentiality agreement appellants’ actions ‘exceed[ed] author-
ized access,’ and so we do not reach the more general arguments made 
about statutory meaning, including whether use of a scraper alone ren-
ders access unauthorized.”52 The appellate court found that there was 
ample evidence that Gormley provided Explorica proprietary infor-
mation about the structure of the website and the tour codes (which 
could be manually compiled in theory), but practically, “Explorica's 
wholesale use of EF's travel codes to facilitate gathering EF's prices 
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 from its website reeks of use—and, indeed, abuse—of proprietary in-
formation that goes beyond any authorized use of EF's website.”53 Fur-
thermore, the court discussed that the confidentiality agreement pro-
hibited the disclosure of information that could reasonably be 
considered to be contradicting EF’s interests. Thus, Explorica was re-
quired to prove that the use of tour codes to mine EF’s pricing data was 
not harmful to EF’s interests.54 The court stated that if EF’s allegations 
were proven, this would likely prove that whatever authorization Ex-
plorica had to navigate around, when accessing EF’s site, it will have 
been exceeded by the use of specialized information and know-how in 
the making of the Scraper program, thus affirming the district court’s 
view that Explorica has violated the CFAA by exceeding its authorized 
access.55  In Explorica, the main factor that determined authorization 
was exceeded was the confidentiality agreement between Gormley and 
EF, the elements of which define the use that would be beyond the na-
ture and the purpose of the access allowed for the general public inter-
acting with EF’s website. The “intended use” test applied in these cases 
is not the sole approach that preceded Brekka and Nosal. 
C. SHURGARD, CITRIN, AND THE AGENCY PRINCIPLE 
 A civil dispute arose between competing companies in Shurgard 
Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.; this case intro-
duced a novel approach to insider-unauthorized acts.56 In Shurgard, the 
plaintiff argued that the defendant had attempted to lure away some of 
the plaintiff’s employees. One such employee, Leland, who had 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s confidential business plan and other trade 
secrets, emailed that information to the defendant before leaving the 
plaintiff’s business.57 The plaintiff sued the defendant under Section 
1030(a)(2)(C) because Leland had intentionally accessed the plaintiff’s 
computers without authorization, or by exceeding his authorization, in 
order to obtain the information.58 The defendant tried to acquire a dis-
missal of the case arguing that Leland’s access was authorized. Howev-
er, the district court decided for the plaintiff, holding that authorization 
ceases to exist for the employees, when they start behaving in a manner 
that would compromise their role as agents of their original employer.59 
The basis of the court’s rationale was the Restatement (Second) of Agen-
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 cy: “[u]nless otherwise agreed, the authority of an agent is terminated, 
if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or 
if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”60  
Consequently, the court argued that the employees, like Leland, who 
collaborated with the defendant “lost their authorization and were 
“without authorization” when they allegedly obtained and sent the pro-
prietary information to the defendant via e-mail.61  
 Shurgard broadens the scope of liability for lack of authorization.62  
The motive of an employee while he uses his work computer determines 
the existence of authorization; thus, an employee could violate the 
CFAA for using his work computer for anything other than work-
related activities.63 The Shurgard perspective eliminates an employee’s 
authorization at the moment the employee acts against his employer’s 
interests. If the Shurgard analysis is used, one must consider when an 
employee might exceed his authorization.   
For example, could an employee be liable for exceeding his authori-
zation if he uses the work computer for personal Internet browsing even 
though the employer banned such use?  Not likely.  Although the em-
ployee goes beyond his authorization, he does not acquire adverse inter-
ests or commit serious breaches of loyalty to the principal, as per the 
agency principle. In order to incur liability for computer fraud under 
Section 1030(a)(4), or computer damage, if Shurgard is employed as 
precedent, there will not be a case where employees could exceed au-
thorization, an approach which is at least inconsistent with the wording 
of the provision, requiring either exceeding authorization or lack of it. 
 The subsequent case of International Airport Centers, LLC v. Cit-
rin64 attempted to clarify the concept of agency and the distinction be-
tween (i) elimination of authorization as in Shurgard and (ii) exceeding 
authorization as in Explorica. Citrin was employed by International 
Airport Centers, LLC (IAC) to assist in the finding and acquisition of 
property, but eventually quit his job with the plaintiff and started his 
own business in breach of his employment contract.65 Before leaving his 
employment with IAC, Citrin erased files on the laptop that IAC had 
provided to Citrin for his employment and rendered the files unrecover-
able.66 The erased data showed evidence of Citrin engaging in improper 
conduct and included files that IAC had no other copies of.67 IAC sued 
under Section 1030(g) for civil compensation, arguing that Citrin had 
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 violated Section 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), which states “the offender knowingly 
causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, 
and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without 
authorization, to a protected computer.”68 Although pressing the delete 
button was not considered a transmission, as per the above provision, 
the transmission of the secure-erase program that made the files unre-
coverable was considered to fall within the scope of “transmitting a pro-
gram, code or command.”69 
 The court applied the principle of agency discussed in Shurgard 
and found that:  
[Citrin’s] authorization to access the laptop terminated when, having 
already engaged in misconduct and decided to quit IAC in violation of 
his employment contract, he resolved to destroy files that incriminat-
ed himself and other files that were also the property of his employer, 
in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes on an em-
ployee.70 
The court considers the Shurgard case, in terms of employing the 
agency principle.  However, at the same time the court argues that the 
distinction between whether Citrin had acted without authorization or 
by exceeding his given authorization is something that is blurry, accept-
ing that exceeding authorization here might be a more likely interpreta-
tion.71 The Citrin court discusses the concept of authorization not just in 
relation to the damage caused without authorization, but also in rela-
tion to the transmission of the information, which the court considers to 
be access.  
 The Citrin court distinguishes the facts of Citrin from those of Ex-
plorica. Although in Explorica access was authorized for the public in 
general, in the Citrin case, authorization solely relied on the profession-
al relationship between the two parties.  The professional relationship 
terminated when Citrin acted disloyally, thus voiding the agency rela-
tionship and with it the basis upon which authorization was initially 
given to Citrin by IAC.72 The court does not clarify whether Citrin 
would have been acquitted, had it been found that he had just exceeded 
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 his authorized access. This issue of exceeding authorization as a basis 
for establishing the computer damage offense, despite the mention of 
the phrase “damage without authorization,” will be of interest towards 
the end of this Article when the potential applicability of the changes to 
authorization that Nosal brings to the computer damage offense is dis-
cussed.  
D. INITIAL CONCLUSIONS 
 In the cases aforementioned, the basis for deciding the lack of, or 
exceeding of, authorization is the bypassing of the purpose for which the 
authorization was given in the first place by somehow violating some 
form of private agreement, explicit or implicit, between the two parties. 
The combination of Citrin, Shurgard, and Explorica provides a very 
confusing mix of interpretations, where employees misusing employer 
resources and information can never exceed authorization. This can on-
ly happen when there is no duty of loyalty based on an agency relation-
ship and when authorization does not rely on such a relationship as the 
sole basis. If Czubinski’s rationale is added to the mix, the result is even 
more confusing, which results in three different interpretations:  
1.  If the duty of loyalty is breached by the employee’s access, au-
thorization is eliminated;  
2.  If a duty of confidentiality by an ex-employee is breached re-
garding access to even publicly accessible information of the employer, 
authorization is exceeded; and 
3.  If an employee violates employer policies, not for the purpose of 
going against the employer’s interests, but rather out of plain curiosity 
or personal reasons, the perpetrator exceeds authorization. 
 Apart from the confusion generated by so many views on the issue 
of insider authorization, Shurgard and Citrin have another important— 
and probably unwanted by the legislature—consequence: an insider 
could also be prosecuted for reckless damage and/or negligent computer 
damage.  In other words, a finding of breach of loyalty eliminates au-
thorization thus rendering an insider’s access equal to an outsider’s un-
authorized access; consequently an insider may face charges of reckless 
or negligent computer damage and loss.  Even though these offenses 
were originally added to prosecute outsiders by requiring unauthorized 
access per se and not just exceeding authorization.73  
 The approach followed in these cases that dominate the interpreta-
tions of exceeding authorization (where someone misuses information 
as an employee in order to defraud his employer) assesses the given au-
thorization to the nature of the relationship between the parties and the 
existence of the ulterior aim of defrauding.  These cases also expand the 
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 possibilities of criminalization for insiders by equating them with out-
siders, even for acts that relate to misuses of information.  
 The problematic expansion of insider liability (the term “insider” 
here applies to employees and those that have authorization to access a 
network or website, including students accessing a university network 
or plain users accessing publicly accessible webpages) and the reliance 
on such expansion pertaining to private agreements was the focal con-
cern in Brekka and Nosal.  The Ninth Circuit attempted to resolve the 
issue of authorization in ways that can avoid excessively criminalizing 
employees and those users accessing public websites against the web-
sites’ use policies. In fact, the new approach established by the ultimate 
decision of the Nosal court, which will be discussed below, has even 
been integrated into a bill for amending the CFAA’s concept of exceed-
ing authorization.74 The integration of the rationales of the Brekka and 
Nosal cases in a new bill makes the discussion of these cases, and main-
ly Nosal, much more pertinent in order to explore the arguments posed 
by the Ninth Circuit and how the final conclusion of Nosal was reached 
after an ambivalent series of rehearing and appeals. Before going into 
Nosal, Brekka will be briefly discussed to serve as an introduction to 
this new approach to exceeding authorization. 
III. A NOVEL APPROACH 
A. BREKKA 
 In Brekka, LVRC Holdings (LVRC) accused Brekka, an LVRC em-
ployee, of obtaining information; thus, engaging in unauthorized com-
puter access and computer fraud, violating Section 1030(a)(2) and Sec-
tion 1030(a)(4) respectively.75  Brekka had access to LVRC’s computers 
while he was employed by the company and had emailed documents to 
himself and his wife.  The appellate court affirmed the decision of the 
district court, which held: 
Because Brekka was authorized to use LVRC's computers while he 
was employed at LVRC, he did not access a computer “without author-
ization” in violation of sections 1030(a)(2) or 1030(a)(4) when he 
emailed documents to himself and to his wife prior to leaving LVRC. 
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 Nor did emailing the documents cause Brekka to “exceed authorized 
access,” because Brekka was entitled to obtain the documents. Fur-
ther, LVRC failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact as to whether Brekka accessed the LVRC website without 
authorization after he left the company.76  
The district court’s rationale would contradict the rationales discussed 
in cases mentioned earlier in this Article, where authorization would be 
eliminated if the employee acted against the interests of the employer. 
However, in Brekka, not only is there an elimination of authorization, 
which would thus establish unauthorized access, as per Shurgard and 
Citrin, but one could not even argue exceeding authorization by refer-
ring to Czubinski’s or Explorica’s “intended use” interpretations of au-
thorization, even though there is obviously a breach of loyalty on behalf 
of Brekka. 
 According to the facts of the case, it was common practice for Brek-
ka to email work-related information to his personal email during the 
course of his work:  
Brekka was assigned a computer at LVRC, but while commuting back 
and forth between Florida and Nevada, he emailed documents he ob-
tained or created in connection with his work for LVRC to his personal 
computer. LVRC and Brekka did not have a written employment 
agreement, nor did LVRC promulgate employee guidelines that would 
prohibit employees from emailing LVRC documents to personal com-
puters.77  
Brekka had also acquired an administrative password for the 
LVRC website, which he later used to email information regarding 
LVRC to himself and his wife78 in relation to negotiations between the 
defendant and LVRC.79 Negotiations eventually broke down and Brek-
ka left LVRC employment, handing in his work computer as well. Later, 
network administrators found that someone was accessing the LVRC 
database using Brekka’s account.80 After deactivating the account, 
LVRC informed the FBI that someone had accessed LVRC’s network 
without authorization.81  
 The district court reasoned that during the time that Brekka was 
employed by LVRC, he had authorization to access the emails and doc-
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78.  These documents included a financial statement for the company, LVRC's mar-
keting budget, admissions reports for patients at Fountain Ridge, and notes Brekka took 
from a meeting with another Nevada mental health provider. On September 4, 2003, 
Brekka emailed a master admissions report, which included the names of past and cur-
rent patients at Fountain Ridge, to his personal email account.  Id. at 1130.  
79.  Id. at 1129-30. 
80. Id. 
81.  Id.   
 uments found on his home computer and his laptop. LVRC did not need 
to prove that he lacked authorization prior to leaving the company,82 
and the district court ultimately granted Brekka’s motion for summary 
judgment.83 Apart from the existence of authorization for Brekka to 
email the documents, since the company employed him, the court held 
that there was no evidence of a confidentiality agreement regarding the 
documents emailed or an explicit obligation on Brekka’s behalf to re-
turn or destroy the documents upon conclusion of his LVRC employ-
ment.84 This part of the argument seems to refer to criteria similar to 
Explorica, which LVRC could not establish as there was no explicit, 
written agreement of confidentiality or employee IT policy between the 
parties, similar to that of EF and Gormley.  Moreover, the district court 
had found that LVRC had not produced evidence from which a reasona-
ble jury could find that Brekka logged onto the LVRC websites after 
leaving employment with the company, thus dismissing all charges and 
claim for restitution under Section 1030(g).85 LVRC appealed. 
 The appellate court addressed two issues also.  First, the court fo-
cused on the existence of authorization, following the plain language of 
the statute.86 Because the word “authorization” is not defined explicitly 
under the Act, the word should be taken to have its ordinary, contempo-
rary meaning.87 The court thus resorted to the dictionary definition of 
“authorization,” defining the term as: “endorse, empower, justify, per-
mit by or as if by some recognized or proper authority.”88 Based on this 
definition, the appellate court reasoned that the employer gives the em-
ployee authorization to access a company computer when the employer 
gives the employee permission to use the computer.89  
LVRC argued that the court should follow the Citrin decision, 
where the employee was considered to have lost authorization when he 
acted against the employer’s interests, breaking a duty of loyalty.90 The 
court here responded that the wording of the CFAA does not support 
the Citrin approach that authorization ceases when an employee uses 
the computer contrary to the employer’s interest. The appellate court 
agreed that Brekka had authorization to access the computer, as his job 
required such access, while Brekka was indeed still employed when he 
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 emailed these documents to himself and his wife.91 The appellate court 
found that the application of Citrin to Brekka’s case would consider him 
to be lacking authorization from the moment the information transfer to 
his computers from the LVRC was done with the purpose to start his 
own competing business, a mental state transforming him from a loyal, 
to a disloyal employee.92 Instead, the court argued:  
The definition of the term “exceeds authorized access” from                   
§ 1030(e)(6) implies that an employee can violate employer-placed lim-
its on accessing information stored on the computer and still have au-
thorization to access that computer. The plain language of the statute 
therefore indicates that “exceeding authorization” depends on actions 
taken by the employer to pose explicit limitations on the use of the au-
thorization given to his/her employees. Nothing in the CFAA suggests 
that a defendant’s liability for accessing a computer without authori-
zation turns on whether the defendant breached a state law duty of 
loyalty to an employer.93  
The court reached this conclusion to avoid a more abstract interpre-
tation, arguing that it could not interpret criminal statutes in surpris-
ing ways that could impose unanticipated penalties on the defendants.94 
Consequently, the court submitted that, unless the employer had actu-
ally taken steps to revoke the employee’s authorization, Brekka would 
have no way of knowing he lacked authorization. There was no explicit 
use policy that prevented Brekka from acting as he did (in fact he was 
emailing himself work documents for work purposes all the time) and 
thus, he could not be found guilty of the said CFAA offenses, just be-
cause his behavior was in breach of a fiduciary duty to an employer.95  
 At the same time, the question naturally arising from the rationale 
of the Brekka court, which required explicit revocation of authorization, 
is, of course, how could the employer revoke authorization, when he is 
not aware of any existing reason to do so? Brekka had not made his in-
tentions known to his employer before the file transfer. In addition, the 
same argument may be valid for other similar cases of disloyal employ-
ees who will seek to take advantage of their authorization against their 
employers without the employers having any knowledge of their em-
ployees’ discrepancies, so as to revoke the authorization. 
 Moreover, another question is whether Brekka was indeed una-
ware that he would be exceeding his authorization while so obviously 
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 acting against his employer’s interests. Since it could be reasonably 
construed that, if the employer knew that authorization was being used 
in order to support a competing business or undermine its interests 
more generally, the employer would most probably rescind the employ-
ee’s authorization. Would it then be a surprise for Brekka to lose his au-
thorization if his use of authorization for unintended purposes was un-
covered? Probably not. Nevertheless, the court seems to have avoided 
such questions. The case of United States v. Nosal, however, broadened 
this interpretation and resolved such issues. 
B. THE NOSAL ODYSSEY 
 Nosal also relates to employees collaborating against their employ-
er, but the implications and discussion in the case went even further to 
discuss authorization in the sense of users violating terms and condi-
tions of websites.  
 Nosal worked as an executive for a company called Korn/Ferry In-
ternational, an executive search firm.  When Nosal left the company, he 
signed a Separation and General Release Agreement and an independ-
ent Contractor Agreement.96 Pursuant to these agreements, Nosal 
agreed to serve as an independent contractor and to avoid competing 
with his former employees for a year in exchange for some pecuniary 
compensation.97 Shortly after leaving, Nosal approached three other 
employees of Korn/Ferry in order to convince them to help him set up a 
competing business.98  These three employees allegedly obtained trade 
secrets and other proprietary information through their accounts, which 
allowed them access to the Korn/Ferry network. Then, they transferred 
to Nosal information coming from the Searcher database of Korn/Ferry, 
which was considered a highly confidential, proprietary, global data-
base of executives and companies.99  
 Korn/Ferry actually took extensive measures to secure its data-
base, as was documented during the hearings, by controlling electronic 
and physical access to it.100 For example, each Korn/Ferry employee was 
assigned a specific username and password to use in order to access the 
database, making sure only employees could access the database.101 
Furthermore, the company required its employees to sign an agreement 
that both explained the confidential, proprietary nature of the Searcher 
database and restricted the use of all information in it, except for legit-
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 imate company business.102 Korn/Ferry further declared the confidenti-
ality of the information by stamping reports using information from 
that database with the phrase: “Korn/Ferry Proprietary and Confiden-
tial.”103 Finally, upon accessing the company computer system, the ac-
cessor was met with a notification, highlighting the proprietary nature 
of the information in the database and the need for specific authoriza-
tion from the company for accessing the database, the lack of which 
could lead to disciplinary action or criminal prosecution.104 
 The Nosal case relates to charges of a computer fraud under Sec-
tion 1030(a)(4) (among other non-CFAA offenses that are irrelevant 
here for the discussion of authorization), alleging that Nosal’s co-
conspirators had exceeded their authorization to access the Korn/Ferry 
computers.105 This was done by obtaining information from their em-
ployer’s computers for the purpose of defrauding Korn/Ferry and assist-
ing Nosal in setting up his competing business.106   
For purposes of discussion in this Article, the initial hearings will 
be identified as Nosal 1.  After the first round of hearings, the case went 
through a second round of hearings, identified herein as Nosal 2 that 
eventually produced an opposite final conclusion from that of Nosal 1. 
1. United States v. Nosal: The First Stage (2011) (“Nosal 1”) 
 Initially, the government filed an indictment against Nosal and 
one of his accomplices for violation of the computer fraud provision, 
pursuant to Section 1030(a)(4)—Nosal being an aider and abettor.107 
Nosal argued that the indictment should be dismissed since employees 
could not have accessed that information without prior authorization, or 
by exceeding their given authorization, because they had permission to 
access that information under certain circumstances.108 He argued that 
the CFAA did not cover employees misappropriating information or vio-
lating confidentiality agreements by using information of the employer 
in a manner that was breaching those private agreements.109 
 The district court initially dismissed Nosal’s arguments regarding 
authorization; yet, Nosal filed a motion to reconsider once Brekka was 
decided, which refined the concepts of lack of authorization and exceed-
ing authorization.110 The District Court agreed with Nosal during that 
second hearing, being compelled by Brekka, to accept that: 
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  the phrase “exceeds authorized access” as used in the CFAA means 
having permission to access a portion of a computer (or certain infor-
mation on a computer), but accessing a different portion of the com-
puter (or different information on the computer) that the employee is 
not entitled to access under any circumstances.111  
The court’s discussion not only links exceeding authorization to the ex-
istence of some prior authorization, but also to the bypassing of tech-
nical restrictions for accessing a network the employer is not authorized 
to access. 
 The district court also stated that intent was not relevant in order 
to determine whether someone exceeds authorized access, even if an 
employee’s access to the computer is expressly limited by the employer’s 
use restrictions.112 The district court’s view is contrary to the “intended 
use” test of Morris and Czubinski and the agency principle in Shurgard 
and Citrin. Consequently, since Nosal’s conspirators had access to the 
information obtained, having remained employees of Korn/Ferry, the 
court did not consider their access as being in excess of authorization, 
despite the existence of obvious fraudulent intent. Thus, the defendants 
were considered not guilty of violating Section 1030(a)(4), with the gov-
ernment appealing that decision.113  
2.  Nosal 1 Appellate Court 
 The appellate court reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the 
question of whether Nosal’s accomplishes had exceeded their authoriza-
tion.114 At first, the appellate court assessed the wording of “exceeding 
authorized access” which reads: “to access a computer with authoriza-
tion and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the comput-
er that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”115  
 The government focused on the word “so,” arguing that Nosal’s in-
terpretation would render the word superfluous, and further added that 
“so” means “in a manner or way that is indicated or suggested.”116 
Therefore, according to the government’s interpretation, an employee 
would exceed authorization when using his authorized access to obtain 
or alter information that he is not entitled to obtain or alter in the 
manner that he does.117 Thus, the government argued that its interpre-
tation of “exceeding authorization” was similar to the “intended use” 
test and consistent with the basic rule that statutes must be interpreted 
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 in such a way, so that no part remains inoperative, superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.118 
 Next, the appellate court evaluated Nosal’s argument that the de-
cision of Brekka nullifies the government’s interpretation mentioned 
above for “exceeding authorized access.”119 The appellate court argued 
that Brekka had decided that the crucial element for assessing whether 
authorization has been exceeded was not the motive of the employee 
and his violation of the interests of the employer, as it would be with 
Citrin, but rather the explicit action by the employer revoking authori-
zation.120 The appellate court voiced its concern about the inability of 
the employee to know that authorization had been revoked without the 
existence of an explicit revocation from the employer. This concern mo-
tivated the court to apply the rule of lenity “which is rooted in consider-
ation of notice and requires courts to limit the reach of criminal statutes 
to the clear import of their text and construe any ambiguity against the 
government” and opt for the more restricted interpretation of exceeding 
authorized access.121 Consequently, since Brekka had not been notified 
of any restrictions to his access, nor had any way of knowing whether or 
when the employer might have revoked his authorization, he was still 
authorized to access the computer he did, even for fraudulent purpos-
es.122 
 The appellate court then argued that its decision that an employ-
er’s use restrictions define whether employees have exceeded their au-
thorization is an application of the above Brekka rationale that bases 
the existence of authorization on the acts of the employer to revoke the 
authorization given. Therefore, according to this rationale, the only log-
ical interpretation of “exceeding authorized access” would be that the 
employer has placed limitations on the employees’ permission to use the 
computer and they have violated those limitations.123  
 The major difference between Brekka and Nosal is that Brekka had 
unrestricted access to the company computer and there were no written 
employment agreement or employee guidelines in order to explicitly 
prohibit employees from emailing LVRC documents for personal use to 
personal computers. Based on these facts, Brekka had not violated any 
established access restrictions; therefore, his access was not exceeding 
authorization.124 However, in the case of Nosal, Korn/Ferry had im-
posed a detailed computer use policy for its employees that entailed 
clear and explicit restrictions on the employees’ access to both the net-
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 work and the Searcher database.125 Therefore, the employees that were 
collaborating with Nosal, and then using their authorization to access 
their employer’s resources in order to defraud Korn/Ferry in violation of 
the company’s access restrictions, were considered to have a fair warn-
ing regarding their potential liability for unauthorized access.126 There-
fore, the rule of lenity could not exonerate the offenders from liability, 
as with Brekka.127 The court argued that Nosal’s concerns about the 
government’s broad interpretation of exceeding authorization that could 
criminalize activities of employees depending on the whims of employ-
ers are eliminated by the Brekka decision.128  The Brekka decision stated 
that the employer can determine whether an employee is acting in an 
authorized manner, as long as the employee has explicit knowledge of 
the employer’s limitations to his/her authorization.129 
 The Nosal 1 court also referred to other circuits having addressed 
the issue. It mentioned United States v. John, in which the court argued 
that when the user knows or reasonably should know that he is not au-
thorized to access a computer and information obtainable from that ac-
cess in furtherance of or to perpetrate a crime, the user is subject to 
prosecution under the CFAA.130 In this case, the employee had accessed 
confidential information in violation of the employer’s computer use re-
strictions.131 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Rodri-
guez followed the Brekka rationale, arguing that an employee of the So-
cial Security Administration that made use of his authorized access to 
obtain information for personal reasons had exceeded authorization.132 
Unlike the Brekka case, the Administration had told Rodriguez that he 
was not authorized to use personal information he could access at work 
for personal reasons.133 
 Based on the above, the appellate court of Nosal 1 reversed the de-
cision of the district court, which had found that Nosal and his accom-
plices had not exceeded their authorization.134 Furthermore, the appel-
late court allayed concerns that its interpretation of exceeding 
authorization, as reliant on the employer’s explicit use policies and ac-
tions would criminalize employees checking sports scores or personal 
email accounts through their work computers.135 The court argued that 
simply using a work computer in violation of the employer’s restrictions 
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 is not a crime under Section 1030(a)(4) since an intent to defraud and 
the obtainment of something of value through that access is also re-
quired.136  
 Yet that would not be the end of the Nosal case. Although the 
above decisions seemed to have finally resolved the issue somewhere in 
between the intended test function and what Nosal was arguing, even-
tually, the Ninth Circuit court decided to rehear the case en banc. The 
court subsequently ended up affirming the very first decision of the dis-
trict court, which the first decisions of the appellate court in 2011 
(Nosal 1) had reversed.  In Nosal 2, the Ninth Circuit found that the vi-
olation of employer computer use policies and terms of use of private 
websites, implicit or explicit, could not be the basis for deciding on the 
lack or the exceeding of authorization.137  
3. United States v. Nosal (2012) (“Nosal 2”) 
 In Nosal 1, the district court had initially rejected Nosal’s argu-
ments regarding the inapplicability of offenses that related to exceeding 
authorized access to his case.138 After Brekka was decided and in light of 
the interpretations introduced by Brekka regarding exceeding authori-
zation, the district court had reheard the case, reversing its initial view 
to agree with Brekka and to consider that there had not been any case 
of unauthorized access or exceeding authorization.139  
 The discussion in the en banc appellate hearing of the Nosal 2 fo-
cused anew on the issue of exceeding authorized access and the two po-
tential readings of the definition of Section 1030(e)(6).140 First, according 
to the defendant, exceeding authorization refers to a person that has 
authorization to access only certain data or files and accesses data or 
files that he is not authorized to, something known as hacking.141 The 
second interpretation, which the government has provided to “exceeding 
authorized access” and which relates to the above concern, is that the 
language of exceeding authorization could refer to a person that has un-
restricted physical access to a computer network, but is restricted 
through employment contracts or computer-use policies in the use of the 
information he is technically able to access.142 The example here is that 
an employee is allowed to access customer lists for doing his job, but not 
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142.  Id. 
 to send them to a competitor,143 which is essentially the rationale fol-
lowed in Czubinski.144 
 Next, the appellate court discussed the suggestions regarding the 
term “entitled” and its meaning in the phrase: “an accesser is not enti-
tled so to obtain or alter.”145 The government pointed to a dictionary def-
inition of “entitle” interpreted as “to furnish with a right.”146 Based on 
that definition, the government argued that Korn/Ferry’s use policies 
for its computer network provided certain rights to the employees, and 
when employees violated those policies, they exceeded their authoriza-
tion by going beyond their given rights.147  
The court, however, argued that the word “entitled” relates to how 
an accesser obtains or alters the information and argued that the more 
sensible interpretation to be followed regarding the term “entitled” 
would be to consider it a synonym for “authorized.”148 If read like this, 
“exceeding authorization” would refer to data or files on a computer 
that the employee is not authorized to access.149  
 Regarding this argument, one cannot help but wonder why the leg-
islature would use two different words if they were meant to signify ex-
actly the same use? An alternative interpretation will be discussed later 
in this Article when discussing the potential alternative interpretations 
for revamping the notion of authorization according to Nosal. 
 Next, the court discussed the governmental interpretation of the 
term “so” in the phrase above.150 The government read “so” to mean “in 
that manner,” which it claimed must relate to computer use policies and 
restrictions, since a narrower interpretation would render “so” super-
fluous.151 The court argued that the interpretation of “so” in such a way 
would turn the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an expansive 
misappropriation statute, placing too much attention on a two-letter 
word.152 As the court further argued, if Congress meant to expand the 
CFAA to criminalize everyone that uses a computer in violation of com-
puter use restrictions, it is expected to use more appropriate and explic-
it wording in order to achieve this result.153 The court also provided ex-
amples that attempt to interpret the reason for inserting “so” in the 
sentence, but argues that it is not clear whether the state might have 
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 just put the word in as a connector or for emphasis instead of doing it 
for a substantive reason.154 
 Eventually, the court agreed with Nosal’s narrower interpretation 
of the CFAA, considering the CFAA an act that relates to penalizing 
hacking and not computer use policy violations.155 The court stated that 
since the CFAA was meant to deal with hacking, it contained the term 
“unauthorized access” for bypassing technological controls.156 That 
means, according to the government, that exceeding authorization re-
lates to users who already have authorization yet use it for unauthor-
ized purposes, as in Czubinski.157 Yet for the court, the above construc-
tion by the government would end up criminalizing any unauthorized 
use (not only in the technological sense here) of information under the 
CFAA only because it was obtained from a computer.  It is highly un-
likely to have been what Congress meant, as it goes well beyond the 
purpose of breaking into a computer.158 The court further provided his-
torical evidence regarding the concept of exceeding authorized access 
that supported its approach to avoid criminalizing an employee for the 
illegitimate use of data.159  
 Before proceeding to analyze the conclusions from the Nosal cases 
and the alternative approach that will be suggested later in this Article 
regarding authorization, it is useful to see how the court justified its ra-
tionale for wanting to avoid criminalization under the CFAA based on 
violating terms of use and employer policies and stick solely to breaking 
into computers. The court focused on the fact that criminalizing casual 
violations of computer-use policies, such as chatting with friends or 
playing games, could become federal crimes if the government’s inter-
pretation of exceeding authorization is accepted.160 As the court argues, 
enforcement of the CFAA against employees has indeed happened; 
therefore, the threat of expanding the CFAA in the way suggested by 
the government should be considered seriously.161 Prosecutors should 
not even have the legal tools available for resorting to ridiculous prose-
cutions, for example, by prosecuting users for violating terms and condi-
tions of websites under the premise of exceeding authorization.  
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  The court argued that employer-employee and company-consumer 
relationships are usually regulated by tort and contract law. The gov-
ernmental view would result in these relationships being manipulated 
by private parties in order to police them through criminal law.162 Fur-
thermore, the court questions the vagueness of the limit between a 
prosecutable and non-prosecutable business purpose, giving examples of 
many innocuous offline behaviors at work that, when transposed online, 
would constitute criminal offenses based on exceeding authorized use of 
the work computers or even terms of service of popular websites, such 
as Google, Facebook or even dating sites.163 The court expressed its con-
cern that attaching felonious liability for CFAA offenses due to an al-
leged violation of vague and unknown or arbitrarily changeable Terms 
of Service could prove very dangerous for millions of plain users.164 The 
fact that the government assures it would not prosecute such types of 
exceeding authorization is not reason for accepting its interpretation, 
since the discretion of prosecutors should not be relied upon.165  
 The court mentions that such governmental guarantees are not to 
be trusted, citing the example of United States v. Drew. In the Drew 
case, the prosecutor decided to press charges against defendant Drew, 
who created a fake Myspace account in order to bully her daughter’s 
friend online.166  Unfortunately, the bullied victim committed suicide.167  
The input of fake information on Myspace on behalf of Drew in order to 
create an account on MySpace as posing as a young boy was in violation 
of the terms of use of the website.168 Based on that fact, the prosecutor 
brought charges against Drew for obtaining information from a protect-
ed computer by exceeding authorized access.169 The rationale is that 
Drew was authorized to use Myspace as an adult user putting in her ac-
tual personal information, but was in breach of Myspace’s terms of use 
when she created the fake account.170  According to the prosecutor, Drew 
exceeded her authorization to use Myspace.171 Drew was initially con-
victed by the jury for a CFAA misdemeanour violation, but that decision 
was overturned by the judge after Drew filed a motion for acquittal.172 
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 The judge accepted that allowing CFAA prosecutions to be based on the 
violation of terms of use as exceeding authorized access would render 
the statute void for vagueness due to a lack of sufficient notice to the 
public regarding such violations and lack of proper prosecutorial guid-
ance on the issue.173 The Nosal 2 court mentions this example in order 
to demonstrate how, despite the government’s assurances regarding ex-
aggerated prosecutions, some prosecutors might give in to political 
pressures, such as those generated by the suicide of the victim in the 
Drew case.174 
 On the same note, the Nosal 2 court also quotes the United States 
v. Kozminski,175 where the court argued that the governmental inter-
pretation of exceeding authorization would “delegate to prosecutors and 
juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type of . . . ac-
tivities are so morally reprehensible that they should be punished as 
crime”’ and would “subject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or dis-
criminatory prosecution and conviction.”176 Based on these concerns, 
Nosal 2, unsurprisingly, decided to follow Brekka and the other courts 
having reached similar conclusions, regarding the criminalization of 
unauthorized access to information and not its misuse.177 Consequently, 
the court found Nosal and his accomplices, who had access to the com-
pany’s databases, could not be charged with computer fraud as they did 
not lack, nor had they exceeded authorization, accepting that the gov-
ernment could prosecute for the rest of the counts of the indictment 
apart from the CFAA-related ones.178 
 Nosal has been a crucial case regarding talks about narrowing 
down the scope of the CFAA, yet the different circuits in the United 
States have been split regarding the interpretation of exceeding author-
ization. 
                                                                                                                          
173. Id. at 464. 
174. Nosal 2, 676 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 2012). 
175.  United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 932 (1988). 
176.  The Nosal court rejected the rationales adopted by other circuits such as those 
having identified breaches of corporate computer use restrictions or violations of a duty of 
loyalty to be within the scope of CFAA. Instead, it urged these courts to reconsider and 
criticized their indifference to the potential consequences of their adoption of such broad 
interpretations of the CFAA for regular employees and Internet users. See, e.g., Rodri-
guez, 628 F.3d 1258 (2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (2010); Int'l Airport Ctrs., 
LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); Nosal 2, 676 F.3d at 870-71. 
177.  Nosal 2, 676 F.3d at 854 (citing e.g. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 
2d 962 (D. Ariz. 2008); Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Diamond Power Int’l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 
2007); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 
479 (D. Md. 2005)). 
178.  Nosal 2, 676 F.3d at 864. 
 IV. THOUGHTS AND CONCERNS NOSAL GENERATES 
A. NOSAL 2 HARMONIZES ALL THE OFFENSES OF THE CFAA 
 The Nosal 2 court made an effort to remedy the problem of having 
different standards for exceeding authorization across different provi-
sions of the same Act. As the court argued, the interpretation of the 
government’s argument regarding exceeding authorization is even more 
problematic since the concept of “exceeding authorized access” exists in 
other offenses apart from computer fraud, Section 1030(a)(4).179 For ex-
ample, in Section 1030(a)(2), “exceeding authorized access” is used to 
obtain information from a protected computer.  The broad interpreta-
tion that has been attributed to the “protected computer” potentially in-
cludes every computer online,180 essentially making every violation of a 
private use policy online on a global scale a federal offense.181  
Consequently, the clarification that liability for exceeding authori-
zation cannot rely on private terms and conditions or employer use poli-
cies is initially important in order to solidify the elements of liability 
and to reduce the chances where users could be prosecuted for CFAA 
offences in general, based on private agreements. What makes the ra-
tionale followed by the Nosal 2 court regarding “exceeding authoriza-
tion” even more pertinent here and demonstrates a disparity in the 
treatment of the different types of insiders is the exclusion of federal 
employees from exceeding authorization, when accessing non-public, 
federal computers, an offense described in Section 1030(a)(3).182  
 Congress has eliminated the possibility of insiders/governmental 
employees being prosecuted under the unauthorized access to federal 
computers offense (Section 1030(a)(3)) for accessing computers in their 
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 own department, where they are authorized to access non-public com-
puters in the course of their duties, by not including the concept of “ex-
ceeding authorized access” in the wording of this provision, thus making 
it applicable only to outsiders.183 The purpose was to avoid criminalizing 
insiders for exceeding their authorization to view information within 
their department. The Committee felt that looking at information in 
one’s own department, where one has authorization to access the infor-
mation technologically through a password, but would not be entitled to 
do so actually—in relation to the nature of his duties—should not be 
considered criminal, and administrative penalties would be more ap-
propriate.184  
 Although Congress adopted the view that prosecutions of insiders 
should be avoided regarding the use of information they are authorized 
to access in their department, despite not having the right to do so as 
far as their duties are concerned, it has decided to preserve exceeding 
authorized access as part of the actus reus of other offenses relating to 
the CFAA. However, similar disputes and problems of excessive crimi-
nalization of insiders have consistently arisen in the private sector, un-
der Section 1030(a)(2) that relates to obtaining information (obtaining 
can be merely looking, as seen above, with no further need for use of 
that information for malign purposes) from protected computers.185 The 
comparison here is made between Section 1030(a)(2) and Section 
1030(a)(3) because these sections are the only sections criminalizing the 
plain obtainment of information without any further malign intent.  
 In the case of Section 1030(a)(3), the State sought to protect its 
own employees from the liability excesses that the vagueness of the 
term “exceeding authorized access” could cause.  But it was not as sen-
sitive regarding insiders/employees in the private sector, allowing for a 
vague term to remain throughout many amendments and failing to pro-
vide a resolution to the issue despite the continuing and expanding con-
flict between the various circuits. Congress has, of course, retained the 
criminalization of interdepartmental unauthorized access, even regard-
ing Section 1030(a)(3), in order to avoid allowing public servants with 
authorization to access certain governmental computers to plead that 
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 they were actually insiders to every non-public governmental computer. 
Different departments with obviously different passwords and computer 
systems would require the bypassing of technological authorization con-
trols and that would render even federal employees liable for unauthor-
ized use. In general, it would appear that intra-departmentally, lack of 
authorization that could amount to criminal charges cannot be consti-
tuted. Interdepartmental unauthorized access, however, for Section 
1030(a)(3) is equated to outsider access, since it would also probably en-
tail the bypassing of technological controls.  
 The court in Nosal 2 attempts to potentially remedy this disparity 
between Section 1030(a)(2) and Section 1030(a)(3) for insiders by ren-
dering “exceeding authorized access” inapplicable to all those having 
some sort of authorization based on a private agreement or terms of 
use, such as plain users or employees accessing their workplace com-
puters just to get information for personal reasons. Nosal seems to be 
drawing the same analogy for insiders, such as employees accessing in-
formation of a private company where they work. According to Nosal 2, 
if the employees have authorization in terms of technological access, 
they cannot be considered to be accessing without authorization or by 
exceeding it and, thus, are in no way prosecutable for it, under the 
CFAA, based solely on violations of terms of use or employer policies. If 
employees do not have technological access to parts of a network they 
are generally authorized to access, they are equal to outsiders for the 
specific part of network or information and, therefore, any bypassing of 
the technological controls and access to the information that was nor-
mally out of bounds is unauthorized access and not in excess of authori-
zation, since the technologically non-accessible part of a network is in 
essence an independent sub-network, that might be part of a network 
the person is normally authorized to access. However, it still is, or 
should be, considered independent in terms of accessibility; therefore, 
access to it should also be treated independently in terms of authoriza-
tion. 
Such a rationale could easily be expanded to insiders and employ-
ees of other sectors where there exist protected computers in order to 
avoid unjust and irrelevant charges under the CFAA for insiders.  
B. EXCEEDING BECOMES EVEN MORE OBSOLETE 
 The harmonization discussed above essentially demonstrates the 
potential obsoleteness of the concept of “exceeding authorization” in its 
current form and conception, a conclusion we can draw not only from 
the decision in Nosal 2, but also from previous cases, which also exten-
sively limited the scope of the term “exceeding authorization.” Shurgard 
and Citrin limited the applicability of “exceeding authorization” to em-
ployee-related cases by finding insider misuses of authorization to be 
 eliminating authorization, rather than exceeding it. This was held to be 
true even if it could be argued that this would be the case only where 
the employee made use of his authorization in ways not just unintend-
ed, but in ways that proved a disloyal behavior towards the employer 
that had given the authorization.  This Article suggests employing the 
rationale of Czubinski in cases where the use was unintended, such as 
private collection of information due to curiosity, but not harmful to the 
employer or for cases like Explorica where private confidentiality 
agreements could indicate that the use of existing authorization was go-
ing beyond the intended limits that authorization was allowed.  
 However, the use of the term in computer fraud regarding employ-
ees would definitely be compromised.  In those cases, either Nosal 2 
would have to be employed (denying that authorization has been ex-
ceeded) or Shurgard/Citrin would have to be used (accepting that au-
thorization has been eliminated). Actually, Nosal 2 eliminates all the 
potential instances that are based on private agreements of computer 
use policies and terms of use or fiduciary duties of employees towards 
employers. This would eliminate the application of any standard dis-
cussed so far for exceeding authorization, be it intended use in Czubin-
ski, breach of loyalty in Shurgard and Citrin, or even the vague Brekka 
standard requiring explicit, prescribed employer computer use policies 
for defining whether authorization has been exceeded.  
 Nosal 2 requires that CFAA liability that is based on exceeding au-
thorized access relate only to cases of violations of technological re-
strictions. Yet, if there are technological restrictions even for insiders, it 
is questionable whether they would be considered insiders practically. 
In this situation, those that have some sort of authorization to access a 
certain network would have to be defined as insiders, but no authoriza-
tion to access another part of the same network. However, this distinc-
tion does not seem to support any practical difference between insiders 
and outsiders, apart from the fact that the alleged insiders have a pre-
existing link—but not full access—to the network they eventually ac-
cess beyond the limits of their given authorization. Since both outsiders 
and the limited-authorization insiders have to bypass technological re-
strictions to access the information in question, they both eventually 
exceed their given authorizations. The fact that insiders might have 
some type of authorization for other files in the same network does not 
seem to make that much of a difference legally regarding sanctions. 
There is no specific provision relating to lesser or higher penalties for 
insiders than outsiders. The potential differentiation could be that tak-
ing advantage of a position of trust as is provided in the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines Section 3B1.3 (abuse of position of trust or use of 
special skill): the defendant abused a position of public or private trust  
[ . . . ] in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or con-
 cealment of the offense.186 If insiders are often considered to be in a po-
sition of trust compared to outsiders, the distinction might be meaning-
ful as it would raise the count by two levels.187 However, the tendency of 
the legislature to want to avoid insider punishment for federal employ-
ees would imply that perhaps in cases of access to information that are 
not part of the employee’s official duties, the penalties would be more 
lenient rather than stricter as a means of highlighting the relationship 
of trust that exists between employers-employees. Consequently, since 
the fact that someone violates the CFAA as an insider rather than an 
outsider does not entail a difference in liability and penalties, the need 
for the use of the term of “exceeding authorization” becomes practically 
obsolete. The employment of the aforementioned sentencing guidelines 
could be supported by the examination of the facts of the case without 
the need for different terminology in the wording of the actual offense.  
 Seeing that many different judicial interpretations of the issue of 
“exceeding authorization” have been so restrictive to the applicability of 
the term, one can argue that this term might have become obsolete over 
the years or even dangerously applicable to inappropriate cases. Such 
cases include those described in Nosal 2 above regarding website terms 
and conditions188 and whether the term “exceeding authorization” could 
be substituted by employing a different wording.  A different wording 
could realize the purpose of the CFAA more consistently to protect from 
computer misuses while eliminating the instances it could be misap-
plied to incidents that relate to privately agreed or imposed restrictions 
on the use of accessible information.   
V. A NEW TERMINOLOGICAL APPROACH TO  
EXCEEDING AUTHORIZATION 
A. FRAGMENTING UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS AND SUBSTITUTING EXCEEDING 
AUTHORIZATION WITH ENTITLEMENT 
 The conflict between the government and the court in Nosal 2 po-
tentially flows from the perception of authorization as one all-
encompassing permit.  This view is reinforced by the interpretation of 
“entitled,” in the definition of exceeding authorization, as “author-
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 ized.”189 An alternative wording that may lead to a clearer interpreta-
tion for lacking or exceeding authorization could be the separation of 
authorization and entitlement as two different concepts, each applicable 
to different conditions. For example, the notion of authorization will be 
strictly linked to technological permits or restrictions and will be frag-
mented into different types of authorized use for different uses of in-
formation in computer systems. This way there would be no “exceeding 
authorization” even for insiders having some level of authorized use, 
but just different levels of authorization that, if violated, would result in 
unauthorized use, the same way as we now perceive it for outsiders. In-
siders will not be able to violate the CFAA within their sphere of tech-
nologically authorized use. However, those insiders lacking some aspect 
of authorization would be prosecutable under the CFAA, when they vio-
late the technical restrictions limiting their extent of authorization. 
This approach would of course be consistent with the decision in Nosal 
2 regarding the concept of exceeding authorization and the need for vio-
lating technical restrictions. 
 For example, under this suggested method, an employee could be 
authorized to view (access) the information, but unauthorized to copy. 
We could consider accessing/viewing as the basic use level that one 
could be authorized to have, perhaps in the form of a password to access 
the network and view information. This would also cover, apart from 
employees, the basic access that relates to users browsing websites or 
using online services, such as Myspace or sport websites. Since access 
immediately allows us to view information and because merely viewing 
it is analagous to obtaining the said information, access could be estab-
lished as an initial type of use.  Other types of use, such as download-
ing, copying, sharing or modifying could be prohibited. Authorization 
could be defined in terms of someone having the technological permit 
allowing certain uses of information, from viewing to deleting. If one 
bypassed technological controls and modified the information he was 
not authorized to modify, even though he had access to view the infor-
mation, he would have acted without authorization and exceeding his 
authorization, because his copying would be unauthorized. 
 The term “exceeding authorized access” seems like a contradiction 
in terms, if we accept the interpretation of Nosal 2 that requires the by-
passing of technological controls in order for insiders to exceed authori-
zation, simultaneously disregarding the interpretation that focuses on 
unauthorized use of authorized access, as in Czubinski. If technological 
restrictions have to be bypassed in order for “exceeding authorized ac-
cess” to be perpetrated by insiders, it can be argued that by instituting 
different levels of authorization, one could just claim that someone has 
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 used information in an unauthorized way, even if he has authorization 
for certain types of use (viewing, but not modifying for example) and 
avoid the confusing double standard of exceeding and lacking authori-
zation. If authorization is perceived as related to a technological permit 
to certain uses of information, one either has authorization to use in-
formation in a specific way through his user codes and passwords, or 
does not. For example, deciding to crack a security code preventing em-
ployee access to certain files and copy information would not be exceed-
ing the purpose authorization was given for, if authorization only relat-
ed to a user code allowing plain access to information, it will instead be 
unauthorized use.  
 The important step towards adopting such an interpretation is the 
development of different levels of authorization codes, much like it has 
been done with documents that are secured from accessing, copying or 
modifying. 
B. ENTITLEMENT FOR EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED ACCESS 
 Turning now to the topic of entitlement in order to assess how the 
notion of entitlement could be distinguished from authorization and 
could fill in the space Nosal 2 created by eliminating the chance of hav-
ing insiders “exceed authorization” in the sense of unintended use of au-
thorization (the Czubisnki way). Reintroducing entitlement as distinct 
from “authorization in a technical sense” will also allow the introduc-
tion of unauthorized use by authorized access in different, yet potential-
ly also punishable, or at least remediable, ways that are more appropri-
ate to the goods being harmed and preserve the rationale in Nosal 2 
without, though, leaving blameworthy excesses unpunishable.  
 The following is an example to show how entitlement will be ap-
plied as a distinct term. An employee is authorized to access and copy 
information in terms of having personal passwords allowing him to go 
through technological restrictions, but he is not entitled to copy the in-
formation for personal purposes, according to explicit employer policies. 
No technical restriction exists to prevent the accessing employee from 
copying; thus, it is up to the employee’s discretion to both access and 
copy, even though he should not copy the information. The concept of 
entitlement could help characterize these instances and distinguish 
them from unauthorized acts. In essence, entitlement can substitute for 
the current concept of exceeding authorized access in those cases where 
private contracts or agreements prohibit certain uses, while they have 
been made technologically feasible for insiders. Violating the limits of 
entitlement in terms of making unintended use of the existing level of 
authorization would, thus, signal the cases when prosecutors might 
need to assess the potential liability of the insider for breach of confi-
dence, theft of trade secrets, or any other applicable offenses. In these 
 cases of insiders lacking the entitlement to make certain use of accessi-
ble information, the aforementioned sentencing guideline relating to a 
position of trust could also apply.190  
 Consequently, for CFAA offenses, there is only one condition of au-
thorization—unauthorized use, yet with varying levels of use being al-
lowed and where the existence of authorization relates to the particular 
level of use made compared to the use allowed by the imposed techno-
logical limitations. The concept of “exceeding authorized access” be-
comes devoid of meaning, something which Nosal 2 and cases like 
Shurgard and Citrin essentially support and is substituted by entitle-
ment, which relates to offenses other than those contained in the CFAA.  
 The element of entitlement and the exceeding of it could allow one 
to find legal solutions against contractually prohibited uses of infor-
mation based on other offenses or civil law, since there would be no 
support for computer misuse offenses in these cases as no technological 
controls would be bypassed. That way, prosecutions or resolutions more 
generally would be possible through the use of more accurate provisions 
regarding problematic uses of information, such as the law of confidence 
or protection of trade secrets.  
Consequently, linking CFAA prosecutions solely to bypassing tech-
nological controls, in the same way that Nosal 2 has done, is important 
in reinstating the original dimensions of the CFAA as an act meant to 
punish computer misuse, either on its own or as a precondition to other 
crimes such as fraud. Moreover, using the term “entitlement” to define 
the cases when another law should resolve a conflict of misuse of infor-
mation accessed by, primarily, employees and secondarily, users brows-
ing websites and using online services, is very useful. The distinction 
facilitated by the suggested terminological changes will satisfy the ra-
tionale that Nosal 2 promoted; thus, disconnecting the prospect of 
CFAA liability from website terms and conditions or employee contracts 
and computer use policies.  The distinction will also provide a more 
clear-cut criterion for deciding when to employ the CFAA in violations 
of private agreements and terms of use of information and when to opt 
for more appropriate laws, such as those relating to trade secret theft or 
the breach private law-based confidentiality agreements and employ-
ment contracts. This rationale is also consistent with the bill suggested 
by Rep. Zoe Lofgren and Sen. Ron Wyden in order to eliminate the term 
of exceeding authorized access and retain only the term access without 
authorization which will mean:  
(A) to obtain information on a protected computer; (B) that the acces-
ser lacks authorization to obtain; and (C) by knowingly circumventing 
one or more technological or physical measures that are designed to 
exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining that in-
                                                                                                                          
190.  See DOYLE, supra note 75. 
 formation.191 
C. NOSAL, THE  NEW APPROACH, AND THE INTENTIONAL  
COMPUTER DAMAGE PROVISION 
Other questions arise from the change in the concept of authoriza-
tion, such as whether Nosal 2 also impacts the intentional computer 
damage provision and whether there is also a need to revamp its phras-
ing in order to clarify and harmonize it with the new approach suggest-
ed by Nosal 2 and the view adopted above in terms of fragmenting the 
levels of authorization. This example will demonstrate how the new ap-
proach to authorization can generally produce more efficient and har-
monized results. 
 The computer damage provision punishes “whoever . . . (5)(A) 
knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or 
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage 
without authorization, to a protected computer.”192  The initial question 
that will have to be answered here is whether the computer damage 
provision is related to the above discussion. Most of the cases mentioned 
discussed herein have been linked to other offenses relating to unau-
thorized access or exceeding authorized access, such as obtaining infor-
mation from a protected computer (Section 1030(a)(2)) or computer 
fraud (Section 1030(a)(4)). However, since the provision includes the no-
tion of causing damage “without authorization,” if authorization is rede-
fined, then perhaps another look should be given to this provision and 
the consequences reconsidering the notion of authorization.  
 Before getting into the discussion of why the provision only men-
tions “without authorization” even though it is meant to be applicable to 
insiders that can also cause damage by exceeding their authorization 
(compared to the provisions relating to reckless or negligent damage 
that only apply to outsiders), one would first have to consider whether 
the phrase “without authorization” only relates to the term of damage 
or to the transmission of a program, information, code, or command as 
well.  The history of the provision could imply that authorization also 
relates to the initial act of transmission since in the past the provision 
had been construed as outlawing: “intentional access . . . without au-
thorization, and by means of . . . such conduct . . . prevent[ing] author-
ized use of any such computer . . . and thereby causes loss to one or 
more others of a value aggregating $1,000 or more . . . ,” the govern-
ment was not required to show that the defendant intentionally pre-
vented use nor that he intentionally caused damage “aggregating 
$1,000 or more.”193  
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  The prosecutors manual, however, makes the issue more compli-
cated by advising that:  
 
by contrast (to the other subsections of the (a)(5)), section 
1030(a)(5)(A) requires proof only of the knowing transmission of data, a 
command, or software to intentionally damage a computer without au-
thorization. The government does not need to prove “access.” Since it is 
possible to damage a computer without “accessing” it, this element is 
easier to prove (except for the mental state requirement). For example, 
where an attacker floods an Internet connection with data during a de-
nial of service attack, the damage is intentional even though the at-
tacker never accessed the site.194  
 
 If the government does not need to prove access, then it does not 
need to prove lack of authorization either—only the mental state needs 
to be proven. This would mean that the phrase “without authorization” 
relates only to damage and not to the transmission causing the damage. 
However, such an interpretation of “access” as something more than 
transmission of information to a website or computer network is seri-
ously challenged. 
 The important issue here is whether transmission of data to reach 
a computer in the form of a denial of service attack would or would not 
mean that the computer is accessed, as the manual describes.195 This is 
the basic step in order to then go into a discussion of whether the term 
“without authorization” attaches to the transmission of data as well as 
the damage. If the transmission is not access, but a stage prior to ac-
cess, then there is no point in discussing whether “without authoriza-
tion” attaches to both transmission and damage or solely to the latter. 
  If the terms “without authorization” attaches to the transmission 
and not just to the damage, since the provision applies to insiders as 
well as outsiders, there would be an important conceptual gap here 
where the term exceeding authorized access, which relates to insiders, 
will be missing from the provision. Thus, an amendment of the CFAA 
based on Nosal 2 will also have to address the issues arising from the 
role of exceeding authorization in computer damage offenses. 
1. Is a Transmission of Information Access? 
 With regard to access, there have been different interpretations 
based either on transpositions of real space concepts to the virtual 
world or based on the exchange of communication data between com-
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 puters.196 For the first approach, the mere sending of information would 
not constitute access, since a further act of going beyond the access re-
strictions of a protected proprietary network or database might be re-
quired. Alternatively, according to the communication-based approach, 
since every attempt to send information is met with a response, from a 
password prompt webpage to a normal webpage for publicly accessible 
websites, any transmission of information would be considered ac-
cess.197 The concept of access becomes particularly blurry, for publicly 
accessible websites where interaction and exchange of information does 
not require any further authorization or intrusion in the network be-
yond the publicly accessible page.  
 Case law has also been quite torn on the issue of access.198 For ex-
ample, in an early Kansas Supreme Court case, State v. Allen, the court 
followed the real/virtual analogy to argue that Allen had not gained ac-
cess to the Bell Company computers since, according to the established 
evidence, he had only reached the stage where he was prompted to en-
ter a password.199 The court rejected an overtly broad definition of ac-
cess in the law and opted for a dictionary interpretation of access, which 
was far narrower, as “freedom or ability to make use thereof.”200  The 
court discussed that Allen had not been able to make any use of the Bell 
computer before entering any right passwords to gain entry, something 
which was not proven by the evidence.201  Of course, for public websites, 
making use would be different than making use of proprietary, closed 
networks, as the former do not require any additional information input 
stage, in contrast to password-protected networks.  
Furthermore, in a similar case, State v. Riley, the court followed the 
statutory broad interpretation of access and found that getting the 
password prompt page and trying to guess passwords amounted to ac-
cess.202 Although this might seem extreme, one should consider that in 
order to get the password prompt page it means that he has made an 
initial contact with a page that is restricted and that this is its initial 
response, i.e., to communicate the restriction of further access or allow 
it.  
 More recently, courts have increasingly favored a broader interpre-
tation of access that is consistent with the communication-based ap-
proach. For example, the court in the case of America Online v. Nation-
al Health Care Discount, Inc. has interpreted emailing a computer as 
access, even based on the dictionary definition employed in the case of 
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 Allen.203  As Kerr argues: “To the NHCD court, access is a physical 
world concept, not a virtual world concept: The question is not whether 
the sender of the communication gains a virtual entrance into the com-
puter from the sender’s standpoint, but whether the communication it-
self is transmitted through the computer.”204 That would definitely ren-
der the transmission of the computer damage provision currently equal 
to access. 
 This is supported by additional cases relating to transmissions of 
information to publicly accessible websites. The court in Explorica has 
considered the transmission of the Scraper and the automated reading 
and compiling of the publicly accessible information as acts of exceeding 
authorized access even though the employees were just accessing in-
formation that was publicly available on open websites. A similar ra-
tionale regarding access to publicly available information simply as 
viewing and compiling lists of it has been adopted also in the case of 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.205 
 The court in Nosal has also considered plain users violating terms 
and conditions of websites as in danger of being considered liable for ex-
ceeding authorized access. The view of the Nosal court would mean that 
it also perceives access not just as having insider access to a protected 
company or public sector computer network, but even as interacting 
with publicly available websites by sending information requests. If 
such uses can be considered liable for exceeding authorized access, ac-
cording to the broad interpretation of the term, then one would have to 
accept that the mainstream interpretation of access includes the inter-
action with a public website. If interaction with a website is considered 
access, then of course sending information to a public website in order 
to slow it down, as with the denial of service attacks example found in 
the prosecutors manual, would also be considered access; thus, the ad-
vice provided seems to be lacking in clarity and to be out of date.  
 Moreover, if the provision of intentional computer damage is to ap-
ply to both outsiders and insiders, which it is, as the Citrin court high-
lights206 and the prosecutors’ manual affirms,207 the term “without au-
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 thorization” should relate to the transmission of the data that causes 
the damage and not to the damage itself, since something that is con-
sidered damaging in the context of the computer damage will always be 
considered unauthorized (or exceeding authorization). If the act of im-
pairment, modification, or deletion/destruction of data that could be 
damaging, is in fact authorized, it would not be considered damaging, 
as it would be done under permission, potentially as part of normal 
network management duties. Therefore, we cannot have an “author-
ized” transmission of data causing damage, having established that the 
transmission is access as well, which would, however, cause “unauthor-
ized” damage with intent. Either the transmission would have to be un-
authorized as well, coming from an outsider, such as a virus, or it will 
have to be at least exceeding authorized access of an insider, since it 
will relate to an act that will be making unintended use of authoriza-
tion an insider will have. 
 Even if “without authorization” is to relate only to damage, since 
the provision is applicable to insiders that have some sort of access as 
well, there should at least be an additional phrase after the term “dam-
age without authorization.” An example would be to add “or by exceed-
ing authorization” in order to relate to those cases where someone in-
tentionally transmits data and causes damage by exceeding 
authorization, such as employees installing a virus that deletes files on 
their work computers, or even plain users getting together to DDoS a 
publicly accessible website, as with anonymous virtual sit-in protests. 
Having only the term “without authorization” implies that the provision 
only refers to outsiders or that Citrin’s approach of the principle of 
agency must be applied eliminating authorization even for insiders and 
also the concept of exceeding authorization.  However, this latter pro-
spect is highly unlikely to be the dominant rationale for authorization 
as Citrin has been criticised by many cases208 and superseded by Nosal 
2. 
 From the above, it can be inferred that the current wording of the 
intentional computer damage offense is not only vague in the sense of 
not clarifying whether without authorization relates to the act of 
transmission as well as to damage, but even though it is meant to apply 
to insiders causing intentional damage, it does not include the terms 
“by exceeding authorization” in addition to “without authorization.” 
Consequently, there seems to be a need for an amendment of the provi-
sion in order to deal with the concept of authorization either as being 
relevant to the act of transmission in addition to damage or just in 
damage in relation to insiders. This means that we will have to discuss 
how Nosal 2 impacts this provision and then how the suggested inter-
pretation of authorization and entitlement could shape the wording of a 
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 more specific intentional computer damage provision relating with the 
same clarity both to insiders and outsiders. 
D.  NOSAL, THE NEW APPROACH AND THE NEW  
INTENTIONAL DAMAGE PROVISION 
 Going through this conceptual labyrinth of authorization, it is im-
portant to say that in the case of the computer damage provision, as it 
is written at the moment, Nosal 2 does not help to reach logical conclu-
sions. Consequently, the CFAA’s wording will need to be amended in 
order to counter phenomena where no technical restrictions are by-
passed, but the nature of the access is damaging to a computer system 
and thus prosecutable by the CFAA. In a sense, the detachment of the 
computer damage provision from unauthorized access is a move to-
wards that direction, but it goes only halfway, mixing up conceptual 
understandings of access and authorization that apply to other provi-
sions of the Act in different ways. 
 Consequently, a new provision needs to be created that will entail 
all the important elements discussed above. The definition of the new 
provision for intentional computer damage could be worded as: “the 
making of unauthorized use (including both unauthorized access and 
exceeding authorized access as discussed above) of data or computer re-
sources in ways that cause damage to the same or other data or com-
puter resources.” 
 Here we need to remind ourselves of the definition of damage:  
“any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a 
system, or information.”209 The question arising is whether someone 
might be authorized to cause such impairments for work purposes, but 
might be deleting information in order to prevent the employer from us-
ing it, while the employee plans to start a competing business. This ac-
tion would fall within the scope of entitlement discussed above, where 
one modifies information by deleting it, but without violating any tech-
nical restriction as Nosal 2 desires. Therefore, this action would not re-
late to intentional computer damage but to potentially civil violations. 
The installation of a virus on the same network in order to delete these 
files would however be unauthorized as it would be an act against the 
antivirus software/firewalls of the employer that will in most cases ex-
ist. Even if there is no bypassing of technical restrictions in the sense of 
gaining access to a network, there is unauthorized use in the sense of 
trying to bypass the antivirus technical safeguards. 
 Perhaps the most challenging issue here is the case of a denial of 
service attack on a publicly accessible website, done through the very 
mainstream, legitimate authorized use of repeatedly requesting infor-
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 mation from the website. In the cases where botnets are employed in 
addition, the charges for unauthorized use of data in order to cause 
damage will be based on the employing of computers that have been 
turned into zombie computers unintentionally by a hacker through the 
unauthorized transmission and use of a trojan-horse software. There-
fore, the use of the zombie computers would be an act in violation of an-
tivirus controls through the unauthorized installation of that software 
on computers protected by even meager technical restrictions. Under 
the suggested definition of intentional damage, botnet attacks would be 
unauthorized use of data or computer resources or programs that cause 
damage to other computers. The further consequence of such an inter-
pretation is that activist protesters that are merely employing their 
personal computers to join in with others doing the same reloading and 
using only their own resources in order to protest by realizing a virtual 
sit-in would not be prosecutable by the intentional computer damage 
provision in general. Moreover, they will not be prosecutable under the 
reckless or negligent provisions since these offenses are meant for out-
siders not having authorization to access to the website and, as has 
been established, for publicly accessible websites, access is authorized 
for everyone able to access the Internet. 
 In cases these protests are facilitated by botnets, prosecutors 
should make efforts to prosecute, not plain users, as has happened of-
ten, but those employing the botnets making unauthorized use of com-
puter resources to cause damage. If plain users knowingly join in with 
groups that employ botnets then they could also be charged with con-
spiracy. However, plain users accessing a website and reloading it 
should not be considered felonious criminals that damage websites, as 
they would not be perpetrating any unauthorized action. Consequently, 
the interpretation of unauthorized use given here manages to allow 
prosecutions of dangerous denial of service perpetrators through armies 
of zombie computers, while allowing plain users to protest without seri-
ous legal consequences. As for those worrying that plain protesters 
might cause serious impairments, it has been argued that most web-
sites today, especially governmental or corporate ones will have the in-
frastructure and defense mechanisms to absorb the amount of traffic 
generated by a few thousand protesters, if their efforts are not magni-
fied by botnets.210 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 As this Article has discussed, the concept of authorization is creat-
ing more problems and controversy than solutions for computer crime. 
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 It seems that it is high time for a radical change that will reinvigorate 
the CFAA and will modernize it in order to be able to constitute an effi-
cient tool for dealing with serious cyber-criminality.  Additionally, the 
CFAA should be amended to avoid being so vague as to allow for con-
tested interpretations and excessive prosecutorial discretion, promoting 
instead a more harmonized application of its provisions. This Article 
aimed to highlight some of the most serious problems, conceptually and 
practically, and to suggest an alternative wording and conception for 
authorization that would be consistent with the above aims of harmoni-
zation, modernization, consistency of goals, and fairness of prosecu-
tions. The recent developments in courts potentially indicate a more 
general shift towards a different approach to cybercrime, also backed by 
legislative proposals. It appears that we will soon be seeing some meas-
ure of reform.  
 In fact, in the EU, a Nosal-like approach is already being promoted 
with the new Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information sys-
tems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA.211 The 
new Directive establishes in Article 3 (Illegal access to information sys-
tems) that member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure 
that “[intentional unauthorized access][ . . . ] is punishable[ . . . ] where 
committed by infringing a security measure, at least for cases which are 
not minor.”212 Moreover, in Recital 17 it is clarified that:   
[C]ontractual obligations or agreements to restrict access to infor-
mation systems by way of a user policy or terms of service, as well as 
labour disputes as regards the access to and use of infor-
mation systems of an employer for private purposes, should not incur 
criminal liability, where the access under such circumstances would 
be deemed unauthorised and would constitute the sole basis for crimi-
nal proceedings.213  
Although implementation of this Directive is not due until 2015 and Ar-
ticle 1 explains that the Directive establishes minimum rules, allowing 
for deviations, it is, nonetheless, an additional indication that global 
perceptions regarding unauthorized access and exceeding authorized 
access might be changing towards a Nosal-like approach.214 This can be 
especially so, since there are tools to deal with unauthorized uses of ac-
cessible information by insiders, such as data protection laws in the EU 
regarding personal data,215 the common law tort of breach of confidence, 
or as in the case of Nosal, charges under economic espionage and theft 
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 of trade secrets, such as those found in the Economic Espionage Act.216 
We can only hope that any changes will be of essence and not just a re-
shuffling of the same notions and provisions. The signs seem to suggest 
we should be optimistic about seeing actual changes.  
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